| Monitoring versus incentives D Demougin, C Fluet European Economic Review 45 (9), 1741-1764, 2001 | 181 | 2001 |
| Preponderance of evidence D Demougin, C Fluet European Economic Review 50 (4), 963-976, 2006 | 142 | 2006 |
| Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation B Bental, D Demougin Journal of Macroeconomics 32 (1), 443-456, 2010 | 135 | 2010 |
| Careers in ongoing hierarchies D Demougin, A Siow The American Economic Review, 1261-1277, 1994 | 135 | 1994 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents D Demougin, C Fluet, C Helm Canadian Journal of Economics, 399-413, 2006 | 99 | 2006 |
| Contractual design with correlated information under limited liability DM Demougin, DA Garvie The RAND Journal of Economics, 477-489, 1991 | 93 | 1991 |
| Deterrence versus judicial error: A comparative view of standards of proof D Demougin, C Fluet Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 2005 | 92 | 2005 |
| Inequity aversion in tournaments D Demougin, C Fluet CIRPEE Working Paper 03-22, 2003 | 88 | 2003 |
| Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem D Demougin, C Fluet Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 1998 | 80 | 1998 |
| Rules of proof, courts, and incentives D Demougin, C Fluet The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (1), 20-40, 2008 | 73 | 2008 |
| Theoretische Grundlagen der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie D Demougin, PJ Jost Die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart, 45-81, 2001 | 67 | 2001 |
| Moral hazard and bargaining power D Demougin, C Helm German Economic Review 7 (4), 463-470, 2006 | 56 | 2006 |
| Group vs. individual performance pay when workers are envious D Demougin, C Fluet Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 3, 18, 2003 | 56 | 2003 |
| Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition D Demougin, C Fluet Economic Theory 17, 489-496, 2001 | 41 | 2001 |
| Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm D Demougin, HW Sinn Journal of Public Economics 55 (2), 203-231, 1994 | 41 | 1994 |
| Incentive contracts and total factor productivity B Bental, D Demougin International Economic Review 47 (3), 1033-1055, 2006 | 39 | 2006 |
| A further justification for the negligence rule D Demougin, C Fluet International Review of Law and Economics 19 (1), 33-45, 1999 | 37 | 1999 |
| A renegotiation-proof mechanism for a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection DM Demougin The Rand Journal of Economics, 256-267, 1989 | 37 | 1989 |
| The inquisitorial and the adversarial procedure in a criminal court setting B Deffains, D Demougin Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 2008 | 32 | 2008 |
| Excess burden of criminality and redistribution D Demougina, R Schwager International Review of Law and Economics 20 (3), 329-351, 2000 | 23 | 2000 |
