George J. Mailath

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andrew postlewaiteProfessor of Economics, University of PennsylvaniaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na econ.upenn.edu
Harold ColeProfessor of Economics, University of PennsylvaniaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na sas.upenn.edu
Michihiro KandoriProfessor of Economics, The University of TokyoPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na e.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Stephen MorrisPeter A. Diamond Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na mit.edu
martin william crippsProfessor of Economics, University College LondonPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na ucl.ac.uk
Jeroen SwinkelsKellogg School of Management, Northwestern UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na kellogg.northwestern.edu
v bhaskarDepartment of Economics, University of Texas at AustinPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na austin.utexas.edu
Volker NockeProfessor of Economics, University of MannheimPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na uni-mannheim.de
Qingmin LiuProfessor of Economics, Columbia UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na columbia.edu
Loretta J. MesterPresident and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of ClevelandPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na clev.frb.org
Jeffrey ElyNorthwestern UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na jeffely.com
Peter ZemskyINSEADPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na insead.edu
Tadashi SekiguchiInstitute of Economic Research, Kyoto UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Dirk KruegerLeonore and Walter Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences, University of PennsylvaniaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na econ.upenn.edu
Ichiro ObaraUniversity of California Los AngelesPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na econ.ucla.edu
Andrew AbelRonald A. Rosenfeld Professor, Dept. of Finance, Wharton School, University of PennsylvaniaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na wharton.upenn.edu
Ernst-Ludwig von ThaddenUniversitaet MannheimPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na uni-mannheim.de
Georg NöldekeFaculty of Business and Economics, University of BaselPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na unibas.ch

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George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania and Australian National University

Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na econ.upenn.edu - Domača stran

microeconomics economic theory game theory reputations matching


Naslov Razvrsti po navedbah Razvrsti po letniku Razvrsti po naslovu	Navedeno Navedeno	Leto
Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games M Kandori, GJ Mailath, R Rob Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 29-56, 1993	2990	1993
Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships GJ Mailath, L Samuelson Oxford university press, 2006	1826	2006
Social norms, savings behavior, and growth HL Cole, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite Journal of Political economy 100 (6), 1092-1125, 1992	1042	1992
Who wants a good reputation? GJ Mailath, L Samuelson The Review of Economic Studies 68 (2), 415-441, 2001	623	2001
Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite The Review of Economic Studies 57 (3), 351-367, 1990	572	1990
Belief-based refinements in signalling games GJ Mailath, M Okuno-Fujiwara, A Postlewaite Journal of Economic Theory 60 (2), 241-276, 1993	504	1993
Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory GJ Mailath Journal of Economic Literature 36 (3), 1347-1374, 1998	439	1998
Incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types GJ Mailath Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1349-1365, 1987	402	1987
A positive analysis of bank closure GJ Mailath, LJ Mester Journal of Financial Intermediation 3 (3), 272-299, 1994	303	1994
Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations MW Cripps, GJ Mailath, L Samuelson Econometrica 72 (2), 407-432, 2004	287	2004
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders GJ Mailath, P Zemsky Games and Economic Behavior 3 (4), 467-486, 1991	279	1991
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory GJ Mailath Journal of economic theory 57 (2), 259-277, 1992	219	1992
Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies HL Cole, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2), 333-373, 2001	198	2001
Stable matching with incomplete information Q Liu, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite, L Samuelson Econometrica 82 (2), 541-587, 2014	192	2014
Repeated games with almost-public monitoring GJ Mailath, S Morris Journal of Economic theory 102 (1), 189-228, 2002	187	2002
Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions GJ Mailath Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1), 169-182, 1993	176	1993
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models HL Cole, GJ Mailath, A Postlewaite Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 19 (3), 12-21, 1995	159	1995
Endogenous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search GJ Mailath, L Samuelson, A Shaked American Economic Review 91 (1), 46-72, 2000	158	2000
Extensive form reasoning in normal form games GJ Mailath, L Samuelson, J Swinkels Foundations in Microeconomic Theory, 451, 1991	127	1991
Simultaneous signaling in an oligopoly model GJ Mailath The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (2), 417-427, 1989	127	1989

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