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Daniel Gottlieb
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Moral incentives in credit card debt repayment: Evidence from a field experiment
L Bursztyn, S Fiorin, D Gottlieb, M Kanz
Journal of Political Economy 127 (4), 1641-1683, 2019
189*2019
Perfect competition in markets with adverse selection
EM Azevedo, D Gottlieb
Econometrica 85 (1), 67-105, 2017
1782017
Lapse-based insurance
D Gottlieb, K Smetters
American Economic Review 111 (8), 2377-2416, 2021
126*2021
Narrow framing and long‐term care insurance
D Gottlieb, OS Mitchell
Journal of Risk and Insurance 87 (4), 861-893, 2020
1192020
A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling
A Araujo, D Gottlieb, H Moreira
The RAND Journal of Economics 38 (4), 1020-1043, 2007
742007
Competition over time‐inconsistent consumers
D Gottlieb
Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 (4), 673-684, 2008
652008
Time lotteries and stochastic impatience
P DeJarnette, D Dillenberger, D Gottlieb, P Ortoleva
Econometrica 88 (2), 619-656, 2020
59*2020
Does improved information improve incentives?
P Chaigneau, A Edmans, D Gottlieb
Journal of Financial Economics 130 (2), 291-307, 2018
59*2018
Imperfect memory and choice under risk
D Gottlieb
Games and Economic Behavior 85, 127-158, 2014
58*2014
Prospect theory, life insurance, and annuities
D Gottlieb
The Wharton School Research Paper, 2012
552012
Long‐term contracting with time‐inconsistent agents
D Gottlieb, X Zhang
Econometrica 89 (2), 793-824, 2021
442021
Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning
R Gomes, D Gottlieb, L Maestri
Games and Economic Behavior 96, 145-169, 2016
422016
Asymmetric information in late 19th century cooperative insurance societies
D Gottlieb
Explorations in Economic History 44 (2), 270-292, 2007
412007
Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences
EM Azevedo, D Gottlieb
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012
372012
Will you never learn? self deception and biases in information processing
D Gottlieb
Unpublished Manuscript, Princeton University, 127-158, 2010
372010
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
D Gottlieb, H Moreira
Theoretical Economics 17 (3), 1357-1401, 2022
302022
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
D Gottlieb, H Moreira
The Wharton School Research Paper, 2015
302015
Simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard
D Gottlieb, H Moreira
Wharton School and EPGE/FGV Working Paper, 2014
282014
The value of performance signals under contracting constraints
P Chaigneau, A Edmans, D Gottlieb
Working Paper, Queenrs University, 2017
26*2017
The partial reinforcement extinction effect depends on learning about nonreinforced trials rather than reinforcement rate.
JA Harris, DWS Kwok, DA Gottlieb
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition 45 (4), 485, 2019
242019
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