Artigos com autorizações de acesso público - Itai AshlagiSaiba mais
24 artigos disponíveis publicamente
Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition
I Ashlagi, Y Kanoria, JD Leshno
Journal of Political Economy 125 (1), 69-98, 2017
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Efficient dynamic barter exchange
R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, Y Kanoria
Operations Research 65 (6), 1446-1459, 2017
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, F Fischer, IA Kash, AD Procaccia
Games and Economic Behavior 91, 284-296, 2015
Autorizações: German Research Foundation
Maximum weight online matching with deadlines
I Ashlagi, M Burq, C Dutta, P Jaillet, A Saberi, C Sholley
arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.03526, 2018
Autorizações: US Department of Defense
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
I Ashlagi, YA Gonczarowski
Journal of Economic Theory 177, 405-425, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, European Commission
Equilibrium allocations under alternative waitlist designs: Evidence from deceased donor kidneys
N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, MA Rees, P Somaini, D Waldinger
Econometrica 89 (1), 37-76, 2021
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US National Institutes of Health
Market failure in kidney exchange
N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, E Azevedo, CR Featherstone, Ö Karaduman
American Economic Review 109 (11), 4026-4070, 2019
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Optimal allocation without money: An engineering approach
I Ashlagi, P Shi
Management Science 62 (4), 1078-1097, 2016
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
I Ashlagi, M Burq, P Jaillet, V Manshadi
Operations Research 67 (4), 927-949, 2019
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense
Sequential mechanisms with ex post individual rationality
I Ashlagi, C Daskalakis, N Haghpanah
Operations Research 71 (1), 245-258, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense
Clearing matching markets efficiently: informative signals and match recommendations
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, Y Kanoria, P Shi
Management Science 66 (5), 2163-2193, 2020
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Kidney exchange: An operations perspective
I Ashlagi, AE Roth
Management Science 67 (9), 5455-5478, 2021
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules
I Ashlagi, A Nikzad, A Romm
Games and Economic Behavior 115, 167-187, 2019
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Social context games
I Ashlagi, P Krysta, M Tennenholtz
International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 675-683, 2008
Autorizações: German Research Foundation
Effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, A Bingaman, M Burq, V Manshadi, D Gamarnik, C Murphey, ...
American Journal of Transplantation 18 (5), 1177-1186, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Matching in dynamic imbalanced markets
I Ashlagi, A Nikzad, P Strack
The Review of Economic Studies 90 (3), 1084-1124, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
On the optimality of greedy policies in dynamic matching
S Kerimov, I Ashlagi, I Gurvich
Operations Research, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense
Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
I Ashlagi, A Saberi, A Shameli
Operations Research 68 (2), 467-479, 2020
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
I Ashlagi, F Klijn
Social Choice and Welfare 39 (1), 23-33, 2012
Autorizações: Government of Spain
What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?
N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, E Azevedo, C Featherstone, Ö Karaduman
AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 334-340, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
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