| Approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer with independent items via symmetries P Kothari, S Singla, D Mohan, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg 2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019 | 31 | 2019 |
| The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018 | 23 | 2018 |
| Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules J Schneider, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 35:1-35:20, 2016 | 18 | 2016 |
| Smoothed analysis of multi-item auctions with correlated values A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 417-418, 2019 | 16 | 2019 |
| Optimal mechanism design for single-minded agents NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 193-256, 2020 | 15 | 2020 |
| The fewest clues problem ED Demaine, F Ma, A Schvartzman, E Waingarten, S Aaronson Theoretical Computer Science 748, 28-39, 2018 | 14 | 2018 |
| Approximately strategyproof tournament rules: On large manipulating sets and cover-consistence A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg, E Zlatin, A Zuo 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 3:1-3:25, 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
| Coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017), 2017 | 10 | 2017 |
| On infinite separations between simple and optimal mechanisms A Psomas, A Schvartzman Cohenca, S Weinberg Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 4818-4829, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
| Bounds for the communication complexity of two-player approximate correlated equilibria YK Ko, A Schvartzman Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 24, 71, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey G Aggarwal, A Badanidiyuru, SR Balseiro, K Bhawalkar, Y Deng, Z Feng, ... ACM SIGecom Exchanges 22 (1), 159-183, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| On infinite separations between simple and optimal mechanisms: A converse of a theorem of hart and nisan A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg Manuscript, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
| 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017) JR Lee, I Panageas, G Piliouras, Z Allen-Zhu, L Orecchia, T Kaufman, ... Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2017 | 2 | 2017 |
| Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.06545, 2016 | 2 | 2016 |
| Platform Competition in the Autobidding World G Aggarwal, A Perlroth, A Schvartzman, M Zhao arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.02699, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling S Assadi, V Kher, G Li, A Schvartzman Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 123-152, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020) E Goldenberg, CS Karthik, O Paradise, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg, ... Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three D Mikšaník, A Schvartzman, J Soukup International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 33-47, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities D Pennock, A Schvartzman, E Xue International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 174-188, 2024 | | 2024 |
| On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms C Alexandros Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2205.13039, 2022 | | 2022 |
S. Matthew WeinbergAssociate Professor, Princeton UniversityE-mail confirmado em princeton.edu