Brendan Lucier

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Vasilis SyrgkanisAssistant Professor, Stanford UniversityE-mail confirmado em stanford.edu
Moshe BabaioffHebrew University of JerusalemE-mail confirmado em mail.huji.ac.il
Renato Paes LemeGoogle ResearchE-mail confirmado em cs.cornell.edu
Michael BrautbarE-mail confirmado em cis.upenn.edu
Nick GravinITCS, Shanghai University of Finance and EconomicsE-mail confirmado em microsoft.com
Jason HartlineProfessor of Computer Science, Northwestern U.E-mail confirmado em northwestern.edu
Ishai MenacheMicrosoft ResearchE-mail confirmado em microsoft.com
Joel OrenX: The Moonshot FactoryE-mail confirmado em cs.toronto.edu
Eva TardosProfessor of Computer Science, Cornell UniversityE-mail confirmado em cornell.edu
Noam NisanProfessor of Computer Science, Hebrew University of JerusalemE-mail confirmado em cs.huji.ac.il
Joseph Seffi NaorTechnionE-mail confirmado em cs.technion.ac.il
Sanjeev KhannaHenry Salvatori Professor of Computer Science, University of PennsylvaniaE-mail confirmado em cis.upenn.edu
Brian W. RogersAssociate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis, Dept. of EconomicsE-mail confirmado em wustl.edu
Michael MolloyUniversity of TorontoE-mail confirmado em cs.toronto.edu
Ankur MoitraNorbert Wiener Professor of Mathematics, MITE-mail confirmado em mit.edu
Shuchi ChawlaUniversity of Wisconsin - MadisonE-mail confirmado em cs.wisc.edu
Jian DingPeking UniversityE-mail confirmado em math.pku.edu.cn
Itai AshlagiStanford UniversityE-mail confirmado em stanford.edu
Balasubramanian SivanGoogle Research, New YorkE-mail confirmado em google.com

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Brendan Lucier

Microsoft Research

E-mail confirmado em microsoft.com

Algorithmic Game Theory Mechanism Design Social Networks


Título Ordenar por citações Ordenar por ano Ordenar por título	Citado por Citado por	Ano
Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time C Borgs, M Brautbar, J Chayes, B Lucier Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014	1010	2014
Combinatorial auctions via posted prices M Feldman, N Gravin, B Lucier Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2014	253	2014
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-40, 2020	247	2020
Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs P Dutting, M Feldman, T Kesselheim, B Lucier SIAM Journal on Computing 49 (3), 540-582, 2020	194	2020
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient M Feldman, H Fu, N Gravin, B Lucier Games and Economic Behavior 123, 327-341, 2020	185*	2020
Non-optimal mechanism design JD Hartline, B Lucier American Economic Review 105 (10), 3102-3124, 2015	155*	2015
Dynamic pricing and traffic engineering for timely inter-datacenter transfers V Jalaparti, I Bliznets, S Kandula, B Lucier, I Menache Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGCOMM Conference, 73-86, 2016	147	2016
An economic view of prophet inequalities B Lucier ACM SIGecom Exchanges 16 (1), 24-47, 2017	134	2017
Robust optimization for non-convex objectives RS Chen, B Lucier, Y Singer, V Syrgkanis Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, 2017	133	2017
Equilibria of greedy combinatorial auctions B Lucier, A Borodin SIAM Journal on Computing 46 (2), 620-660, 2017	117*	2017
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, B Lucier, ... Journal of Economic Theory 156, 343-388, 2015	103	2015
Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets M Abolhassani, S Ehsani, H Esfandiari, MT Hajiaghayi, R Kleinberg, ... Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2017	101	2017
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 81-90, 2011	94	2011
On revenue in the generalized second price auction B Lucier, R Paes Leme, É Tardos Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web, 361-370, 2012	92	2012
Efficient online scheduling for deadline-sensitive jobs B Lucier, I Menache, J Naor, J Yaniv Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in …, 2013	90	2013
Dueling algorithms N Immorlica, AT Kalai, B Lucier, A Moitra, A Postlewaite, M Tennenholtz Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2011	87	2011
From duels to battlefields: Computing equilibria of Blotto and other games AM Ahmadinejad, S Dehghani, MT Hajiaghayi, B Lucier, H Mahini, ... Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (4), 1304-1325, 2019	83	2019
GSP auctions with correlated types B Lucier, R Paes Leme Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 71-80, 2011	82	2011
Maximizing welfare with incentive-aware evaluation mechanisms N Haghtalab, N Immorlica, B Lucier, JZ Wang arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.01956, 2020	80	2020
Influence at scale: Distributed computation of complex contagion in networks B Lucier, J Oren, Y Singer Proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge …, 2015	73	2015

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