Acesso público

Optimal crowdsourcing contests

S Chawla, JD Hartline, B Sivan

Games and Economic Behavior 113, 80-96, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms

S Alaei, H Fu, N Haghpanah, J Hartline, A Malekian

Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (3), 1058-1086, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense, Natural Sciences …

[PDF] psu.edu

When is pure bundling optimal?

N Haghpanah, J Hartline

The Review of Economic Studies 88 (3), 1127-1156, 2021

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

[PDF] sciencedirect.com

Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing

S Alaei, J Hartline, R Niazadeh, E Pountourakis, Y Yuan

Games and Economic Behavior 118, 494-510, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

[HTML] acm.org

Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design

S Dughmi, J Hartline, RD Kleinberg, R Niazadeh

Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (2), 1-30, 2021

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Optimization of scoring rules

Y Li, JD Hartline, L Shan, Y Wu

Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 988-989, 2022

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms

J Hartline, S Taggart

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 399-416, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Mechanisms for a no-regret agent: Beyond the common prior

MK Camara, JD Hartline, A Johnsen

2020 ieee 61st annual symposium on foundations of computer science (focs …, 2020

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Bayesian budget feasibility with posted pricing

E Balkanski, JD Hartline

Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web, 189-203, 2016

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

A/B testing of auctions

S Chawla, J Hartline, D Nekipelov

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 19-20, 2016

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

An end-to-end argument in mechanism design (prior-independent auctions for budgeted agents)

Y Feng, JD Hartline

2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2018

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

A truthful cardinal mechanism for one-sided matching

R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline

Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete …, 2020

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Benchmark design and prior-independent optimization

J Hartline, A Johnsen, Y Li

2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2020

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

[PDF] mlr.press

Optimal scoring rules for multi-dimensional effort

JD Hartline, L Shan, Y Li, Y Wu

The Thirty Sixth Annual Conference on Learning Theory, 2624-2650, 2023

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

[PDF] siam.org

Simple mechanisms for non-linear agents

Y Feng, JD Hartline, Y Li

Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2023

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing: Beyond linear utility

Y Feng, JD Hartline, Y Li

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 885-886, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces

JD Hartline, A Johnsen, D Nekipelov, O Zoeter

Proceedings of the 2019 acm conference on economics and computation, 591-592, 2019

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Fast core pricing for rich advertising auctions

R Niazadeh, J Hartline, N Immorlica, MR Khani, B Lucier

Operations Research 70 (1), 223-240, 2022

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation

Revelation gap for pricing from samples

Y Feng, JD Hartline, Y Li

Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2021

Autorizações: US National Science Foundation