Artigos com autorizações de acesso público - Vijay VaziraniSaiba mais
2 artigos não disponíveis publicamente
Substitution with satiation: A new class of utility functions and a complementary pivot algorithm
J Garg, R Mehta, VV Vazirani
Mathematics of Operations Research 43 (3), 996-1024, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Probabilistic estimation of overlap graphs for large sequence datasets
R Nihalani, SP Chockalingam, S Zhu, V Vazirani, S Aluru
2017 IEEE International Conference on Bioinformatics and Biomedicine (BIBM …, 2017
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
18 artigos disponíveis publicamente
Convex program duality, Fisher markets, and Nash social welfare
R Cole, N Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, S Yazdanbod
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-460, 2017
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
N Anari, T Mai, SO Gharan, VV Vazirani
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
∃ r-completeness for decision versions of multi-player (symmetric) nash equilibria
J Garg, R Mehta, VV Vazirani, S Yazdanbod
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (1), 1-23, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Settling the complexity of Leontief and PLC exchange markets under exact and approximate equilibria
J Garg, R Mehta, VV Vazirani, S Yazdanbod
Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2017
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Planar graph perfect matching is in NC
N Anari, VV Vazirani
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-34, 2020
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Cycles in zero-sum differential games and biological diversity
T Mai, M Mihail, I Panageas, W Ratcliff, V Vazirani, P Yunker
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 339-350, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management
R Mehta, VV Vazirani
Theoretical Computer Science 818, 41-50, 2020
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
The general graph matching game: Approximate core
VV Vazirani
Games and Economic Behavior 132, 478-486, 2022
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
A new class of combinatorial markets with covering constraints: Algorithms and applications
NR Devanur, J Garg, R Mehta, VV Vaziranb, S Yazdanbod
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Dichotomies in equilibrium computation and membership of PLC markets in FIXP
J Garg, R Mehta, VV Vazirani
Theory of Computing 12 (1), 1-25, 2016
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
NC algorithms for computing a perfect matching, the number of perfect matchings, and a maximum flow in one-crossing-minor-free graphs
D Eppstein, VV Vazirani
The 31st ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, 23-30, 2019
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility
A Galichon, B Salanié
Online and Matching-Based Market Design, 2022
Autorizações: European Commission
NC algorithms for computing a perfect matching and a maximum flow in one-crossing-minor-free graphs
D Eppstein, VV Vazirani
SIAM Journal on Computing 50 (3), 1014-1033, 2021
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
A real polynomial for bipartite graph minimum weight perfect matchings
T Tröbst, VV Vazirani
Information Processing Letters 179, 106286, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of Multiple Instances
RR Gangam, T Mai, N Raju, VV Vazirani
arXiv preprint 2304, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords (Invited Talk)
VV Vazirani
47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science …, 2022
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
Insights into the core of the assignment game via complementarity
VV Vazirani
Available at SSRN 4061003, 2022
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
A Nash-Bargaining-Based Mechanism for One-Sided Matching Markets and Dichotomous Utilities
J Garg, VV Vazirani
AAMAS Conference proceedings, 2023
Autorizações: US National Science Foundation
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