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Daniel Schoepflin
Daniel Schoepflin
Postdoc; DIMACS - Rutgers University
E-mail confirmado em drexel.edu - Página inicial
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Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions∗
E Balkanski, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan
Proceedings of the 2022 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2022
192022
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents
A Baklanov, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin
arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.11348, 2021
152021
Achieving proportionality up to the maximin item with indivisible goods
A Baklanov, P Garimidi, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5143-5150, 2021
152021
Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
V Gkatzelis, R Patel, E Pountourakis, D Schoepflin
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 64-78, 2021
102021
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions
M Feldman, V Gkatzelis, N Gravin, D Schoepflin
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 820-845, 2022
92022
Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond
G Christodoulou, V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin
13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022), 2022
82022
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods
I Caragiannis, V Gkatzelis, A Psomas, D Schoepflin
arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.04662, 2022
22022
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice
V Gkatzelis, D Schoepflin, X Tan
arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.06483, 2024
2024
Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization
T Ezra, D Schoepflin, A Shaulker
arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.16972, 2024
2024
Designing and Analyzing Clock Auctions
DR Schoepflin
Drexel University, 2023
2023
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