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David C. Parkes
David C. Parkes
George F. Colony Professor of Computer Science, Harvard University
Zweryfikowany adres z eecs.harvard.edu - Strona główna
Tytuł
Cytowane przez
Cytowane przez
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Scratch: programming for all
M Resnick, J Maloney, A Monroy-Hernández, N Rusk, E Eastmond, ...
Communications of the ACM 52 (11), 60-67, 2009
52242009
Machine behaviour
I Rahwan, M Cebrian, N Obradovich, J Bongard, JF Bonnefon, C Breazeal, ...
Nature 568 (7753), 477-486, 2019
12772019
Artificial intelligence and life in 2030: the one hundred year study on artificial intelligence
P Stone, R Brooks, E Brynjolfsson, R Calo, O Etzioni, G Hager, ...
arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.06318, 2022
11992022
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice
DC Parkes, LH Ungar
Aaai/iaai 7481, 53, 2000
6882000
Iterative combinatorial auctions: Achieving economic and computational efficiency
DC Parkes
University of Pennsylvania, 2001
4652001
Computational-mechanism design: A call to arms
RK Dash, NR Jennings, DC Parkes
IEEE intelligent systems 18 (6), 40-47, 2005
4572005
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
D Parkes, JR Kalagnanam, M Eso
3582001
Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer networks
J Shneidman, DC Parkes
International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 139-148, 2003
3512003
Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence
DC Parkes, MP Wellman
Science 349 (6245), 267-272, 2015
3152015
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 148-157, 1999
3051999
Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
DC Parkes, J Kalagnanam
Management Science 51 (3), 435-451, 2005
2902005
Beyond dominant resource fairness: Extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities
DC Parkes, AD Procaccia, N Shah
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 3 (1), 1-22, 2015
2852015
Optimal auctions through deep learning
P Dütting, Z Feng, H Narasimhan, D Parkes, SS Ravindranath
International Conference on Machine Learning, 1706-1715, 2019
2562019
Truth, justice, and cake cutting
Y Chen, JK Lai, DC Parkes, AD Procaccia
Games and Economic Behavior 77 (1), 284-297, 2013
2502013
An MDP-based approach to online mechanism design
DC Parkes, S Singh
Advances in neural information processing systems 16, 2003
2492003
How do fairness definitions fare? Examining public attitudes towards algorithmic definitions of fairness
NA Saxena, K Huang, E DeFilippis, G Radanovic, DC Parkes, Y Liu
Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 99-106, 2019
2472019
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
MT Hajiaghayi, R Kleinberg, DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 71-80, 2004
2462004
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis
J Freudiger, MH Manshaei, JP Hubaux, DC Parkes
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications …, 2009
2352009
Decentralized, adaptive resource allocation for sensor networks
G Mainland, DC Parkes, M Welsh
Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design …, 2005
2302005
Mirage: A microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds
BN Chun, P Buonadonna, A AuYoung, C Ng, DC Parkes, J Shneidman, ...
The Second IEEE Workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors, 2005. EmNetS-II., 19-28, 2005
2242005
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