| Dualist mental causation and the exclusion problem T Kroedel Noûs 49 (2), 357-375, 2015 | 53 | 2015 |
| Grounding mental causation T Kroedel, M Schulz Synthese 193, 1909-1923, 2016 | 50 | 2016 |
| Counterfactuals and the epistemology of modality T Kroedel Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12), 2012 | 47 | 2012 |
| The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility T Kroedel Analysis 72 (1), 57-60, 2012 | 43 | 2012 |
| Mental Causation: A Counterfactual Theory T Kroedel Cambridge University Press, 2020 | 36 | 2020 |
| Mental causation as multiple causation T Kroedel Philosophical Studies 139, 125-143, 2008 | 32 | 2008 |
| Counterfactual dependence and Arrow T Kroedel, F Huber Noûs 47 (3), 453-466, 2013 | 26 | 2013 |
| Modal knowledge, evolution, and counterfactuals T Kroedel Modal epistemology after rationalism, 179-195, 2017 | 19 | 2017 |
| A simple argument for downward causation T Kroedel Synthese 192, 841-858, 2015 | 16 | 2015 |
| Relativity, quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, and causation L Fenton-Glynn, T Kroedel The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1), 45-67, 2015 | 15 | 2015 |
| The permissibility solution to the lottery paradox – reply to Littlejohn T Kroedel Logos & Episteme 4 (1), 103-111, 2013 | 9 | 2013 |
| Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate–Another Reply to Littlejohn T Kroedel Logos & Episteme 4 (4), 451-455, 2013 | 7 | 2013 |
| Implicit definition and the application of logic T Kroedel Philosophical studies 158, 131-148, 2012 | 4 | 2012 |
| The lottery, the preface, and conditions on permissible belief T Kroedel Erkenntnis 83, 741-751, 2018 | 3 | 2018 |
| Norms, epistemic norms, context, and counterfactuals T Kroedel Synthese 201 (5), 172, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| Mental causation T Kroedel Encyclopedia of the Mind, 2013 | 1* | 2013 |
| How not to intervene on mental causes T Kroedel Philosophical Studies 181 (10), 2479-2497, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Valid and invalid causal arguments for physicalism T Kroedel Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (65), 1-13, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Removing Realizers: Reply to Rellihan T Kroedel Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (11), 150-156, 2022 | | 2022 |
| A new future similarity objection T Kroedel Philosophical Studies 175 (6), 1477-1493, 2018 | | 2018 |
Moritz SchulzProfessor of Philosophy, TU DresdenVerifisert e-postadresse på tu-dresden.de