| Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction V Gretschko, S Knapek, A Wambach Cambridge University Press, 2017 | 26* | 2017 |
| Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015 M Bichler, V Gretschko, M Janssen Telecommunications Policy 41 (5-6), 325-340, 2017 | 22 | 2017 |
| Excess information acquisition in auctions V Gretschko, A Rajko Experimental Economics 18, 335-355, 2015 | 21 | 2015 |
| Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations V Gretschko, A Wambach The RAND Journal of Economics 47 (4), 914-934, 2016 | 20 | 2016 |
| Information acquisition during a descending auction V Gretschko, A Wambach Economic Theory 55 (3), 731-751, 2014 | 13 | 2014 |
| Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment T Riehm, N Fugger, P Gillen, V Gretschko, P Werner Journal of Public Economics 212, 104701, 2022 | 11* | 2022 |
| Incomplete contracts in multi-period procurement V Gretschko, M Pollrich Management Science 68 (7), 5146-5161, 2022 | 9* | 2022 |
| On the strictly descending multi-unit auction V Gretschko, A Rasch, A Wambach Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 79-85, 2014 | 9 | 2014 |
| Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050 A Ashour Novirdoust, M Bichler, C Bojung, HU Buhl, G Fridgen, ... Fraunhofer-Publica, 2021 | 7 | 2021 |
| Electricity spot market design 2030-2050 AA Novirdoust, M Bichler, C Bojung, HU Buhl, G Fridgen, V Gretschko, ... | 7 | 2021 |
| Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? P Gillen, V Gretschko, A Rasch Economic Theory Bulletin 5, 139-150, 2017 | 6 | 2017 |
| Sequential procurement with limited commitment N Fugger, V Gretschko, M Pollrich ZEW Discussion Papers, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions V Gretschko, H Mass Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 61-93, 2024 | 4* | 2024 |
| A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas: Comment V Gretschko Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher V Gretschko, A Ockenfels Wirtschaftsdienst 103 (2), 105-111, 2023 | 2 | 2023 |
| Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values V Gretschko, A Wambach ZEW Discussion Papers, 2017 | 2 | 2017 |
| Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer V Gretschko, N Fugger, P Gillen Wirtschaftsdienst 96 (9), 626-627, 2016 | 2 | 2016 |
| Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen: Stellungnahme des ZEW Mannheim im Rahmen der öffentlichen Konsultation der … V Gretschko, A Wambach ZEW-Kurzexpertise 21, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
| Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement H Mass, N Fugger, V Gretschko, A Wambach American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12 (3), 189-245, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign V Gretschko, T Klein, A Wambach Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium: WiSt 48 (4), 22-28, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
Achim WambachZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic ReseachVerifisert e-postadresse på zew.de