| Beyond the VCG mechanism: truthful reverse auctions for relay selection with high data rates, high base station utility and low interference in D2D networks MVS Aditya, H Pancholi, P Priyanka, GS Kasbekar Wireless Networks 26, 3861-3882, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| Price competition in spectrum markets: How accurate is the continuous prices approximation? MVS Aditya, A Raghuvanshi, GS Kasbekar IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking 4 (4), 773-786, 2018 | 5 | 2018 |
| Coalitional Game Framework for Content Distribution Using Device-to-Device<? brk?> Communication MVS Aditya, C Shrivastava, GS Kasbekar IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 70 (5), 4907-4923, 2021 | 4 | 2021 |
| Truthful reverse auction for relay selection, with high data rate and base station utility, in D2D networks MVS Aditya, P Priyanka, GS Kasbekar 2017 Twenty-third National Conference on Communications (NCC), 1-6, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Beyond the VCG mechanism: Truthful reverse auctions for relay selection with high data rates, high base station utility and low interference in D2D networks A MVS, H Pancholi, GS Kasbekar arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.00379, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
| Coalitional Game Framework for Content Distribution Using Device-to-device Communication A MVS, C Shrivastava, GS Kasbekar arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.06975, 2019 | | 2019 |
| Coalitional Game Framework for Content Distribution Using Device-to-Device Communication A MVS, C Shrivastava, GS Kasbekar 2019 IEEE 89th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Spring), 2019 | | 2019 |
| Price competition in Spectrum Markets: how accurate is the continuous prices approximation A MVS, A Raghuvanshi, GS Kasbekar 2016 IEEE vehicular technology conference (Fall), 2016 | | 2016 |
| Price Competition in Spectrum Markets: How Accurate is the Continuous Prices Approximation? GS Kasbekar | | |
Gaurav S. KasbekarProfessor, Dept. of Electrical Engineering, IIT Bombay確認したメール アドレス: ee.iitb.ac.in