Segui
Maryam Saeedi
Titolo
Citata da
Citata da
Anno
Reputation and regulations: Evidence from eBay
X Hui, M Saeedi, Z Shen, N Sundaresan
Management Science 62 (12), 3604-3616, 2016
227*2016
Reputation and adverse selection: Theory and evidence from eBay
M Saeedi
The RAND Journal of Economics 50 (4), 822-853, 2019
942019
Adverse selection or moral hazard, an empirical study
X Hui, M Saeedi, N Sundaresan
The Journal of Industrial Economics 66 (3), 610-649, 2018
66*2018
Raising the bar: Certification thresholds and market outcomes
X Hui, M Saeedi, G Spagnolo, S Tadelis
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15 (2), 599-626, 2023
58*2023
Optimal rating design under moral hazard
M Saeedi, A Shourideh
arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.09529, 2020
302020
Bidding dynamics in auctions
H Hopenhayn, M Saeedi
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016
30*2016
Optimal simple ratings
H Hopenhayn, M Saeedi
Working Paper.[1], 2024
19*2024
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
H Hopenhayn, M Saeedi
Theoretical Economics 18 (4), 1317-1344, 2023
18*2023
Getting the agent to wait
M Saeedi, Y Shen, A Shourideh
arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.19127, 2024
22024
Essays on reputation
M Saeedi
University of Minnesota, 2012
22012
Equivalent Certain Values and Dynamic Irreversibility
H Hopenhayn, M Saeedi
2024
(Dis)Information Wars
SW Adrian Casillas, Maryam Farboodi, Layla Hashemi, Maryam Saeedi
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/disinformation-wars/, 0
Dynamic Value Shading
H Hopenhayn, M Saeedi
https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/msaeedi/dynamic_value_shading.pdf, 0
Il sistema al momento non può eseguire l'operazione. Riprova più tardi.
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