Artikel dengan mandat akses publik - Shaddin DughmiPelajari lebih lanjut
Tersedia di suatu tempat: 17
Algorithmic bayesian persuasion
S Dughmi, H Xu
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Algorithmic information structure design: a survey
S Dughmi
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 15 (2), 2-24, 2017
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
On the hardness of designing public signals
S Dughmi
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 609-625, 2019
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games.
H Xu, R Freeman, V Conitzer, S Dughmi, M Tambe
AAMAS, 150-158, 2016
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Algorithmic persuasion with no externalities
S Dughmi, H Xu
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 351-368, 2017
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design
S Dughmi, J Hartline, RD Kleinberg, R Niazadeh
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (2), 1-30, 2021
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Persuasion with limited communication
S Dughmi, D Kempe, R Qiang
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 663-680, 2016
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Of the people: voting is more effective with representative candidates
Y Cheng, S Dughmi, D Kempe
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 305-322, 2017
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Delegated Pandora's box
C Bechtel, S Dughmi, N Patel
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 666-693, 2022
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
On the distortion of voting with multiple representative candidates
Y Cheng, S Dughmi, D Kempe
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 32 (1), 2018
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
S Dughmi, R Niazadeh, A Psomas, SM Weinberg
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 142-155, 2019
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
R Deo-Campo Vuong, S Dughmi, N Patel, A Prasad
Proceedings of the 2024 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2024
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Optimal mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and combinatorial public projects via convex rounding
S Dughmi, T Roughgarden, Q Yan
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 63 (4), 1-33, 2016
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
Lottery pricing equilibria
S Dughmi, A Eden, M Feldman, A Fiat, S Leonardi
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 401-418, 2016
Mandat: US National Science Foundation, European Commission
Algorithmic signaling of features in auction design
S Dughmi, N Immorlica, R O’Donnell, LY Tan
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 150-162, 2015
Mandat: European Commission
Transductive Learning is Compact
J Asilis, S Devic, S Dughmi, V Sharan, SH Teng
arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10360, 2024
Mandat: US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense
Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
V Conitzer, Y Deng, S Dughmi
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 444-458, 2020
Mandat: US National Science Foundation
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