What is social construction? E Diaz‐Leon European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4), 1137-1152, 2015 | 142 | 2015 |
Woman as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle E Diaz‐Leon Hypatia 31 (2), 245-258, 2016 | 115 | 2016 |
Feminist philosophy of language J Saul, E Diaz-Leon, S Hesni | 115 | 2004 |
Can phenomenal concepts explain the epistemic gap? E Diaz-Leon Mind 119 (476), 933-951, 2010 | 38 | 2010 |
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment E Diaz-Leon Philosophical Studies 155, 99-116, 2011 | 32 | 2011 |
Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong? E Diaz‐Leon Ratio 27 (1), 1-16, 2014 | 30 | 2014 |
Defending the phenomenal concept strategy E Diaz-Leon Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4), 597-610, 2008 | 29 | 2008 |
In defence of historical constructivism about races E Diaz-Leon Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2, 2015 | 22 | 2015 |
Sexual Orientations E Díaz-León Feminist Philosophy of Mind, 294, 2022 | 18 | 2022 |
Sexual orientation as interpretation? Sexual desires, concepts, and choice E Díaz-León Journal of Social Ontology 3 (2), 231-248, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
Epistemic Contextualism and conceptual ethics E Díaz-León The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 71-80, 2017 | 15 | 2017 |
On Haslanger’s meta-metaphysics: Social structures and metaphysical deflationism E Díaz-León | 13 | 2018 |
Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque E Diaz-Leon Philosophical Psychology 29 (8), 1186-1199, 2016 | 12 | 2016 |
Social kinds, conceptual analysis, and the operative concept: a reply to Haslanger E Diaz-Leon Humana. Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (22), 57-74, 2012 | 12 | 2012 |
Pejorative terms and the semantic strategy E Diaz-Leon Acta Analytica 35, 23-34, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
The meaning of ‘Woman’and the political turn in philosophy of language E Diaz-Leon The political turn in analytic philosophy: reflections on social injustice …, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
Kinds of social construction E Diaz-Leon Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, 103-122, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |
Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language E Díaz-León Philosophy: Feminism, Farmington Hills, Mich, 251-271, 2017 | 6 | 2017 |
Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap? E Diaz-Leon Mind 119 (476), 933-51, 2010 | 6 | 2010 |
Substantive metaphysical debates about gender and race: Verbal disputes and metaphysical deflationism. E Díaz‐León Journal of social Philosophy 53 (4), 2022 | 5 | 2022 |