Követés
jesse fried
jesse fried
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
E-mail megerősítve itt: law.harvard.edu
Cím
Hivatkozott rá
Hivatkozott rá
Év
Executive compensation as an agency problem
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Journal of economic perspectives 17 (3), 71-92, 2003
40762003
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
L Bebchuk, JM Fried
Harvard University Press, 2006
34432006
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation
LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker
National bureau of economic research, 2002
30922002
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Journal of applied corporate finance 17 (4), 8-23, 2005
7842005
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Yale Lj 105, 857, 1995
7391995
Pay without performance
L Bebchuk, J Fried
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004
5062004
Paying for long-term performance
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1915-1959, 2010
4562010
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
US Corporate Governance, 113-143, 2009
3842009
Agency costs of venture capitalist control in startups
JM Fried, M Ganor
NYUL rev. 81, 967, 2006
3092006
Reducing the profitability of corporate insider trading through pretrading disclosure
JM Fried
S. Cal. L. Rev. 71, 303, 1997
2231997
Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
LA Bebchuk, J Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004
1642004
Informed trading and false signaling with open market repurchases
JM Fried
Calif. L. Rev. 93, 1323, 2005
1602005
The uneasy case for favoring long-term shareholders
JM Fried
Yale LJ 124, 1554, 2014
1542014
Insider signaling and insider trading with repurchase tender offers
JM Fried
The University of Chicago Law Review, 421-477, 2000
1502000
Executive compensation in America: optimal contracting or extraction of rents?
LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001
1392001
Excess-pay clawbacks
J Fried
J. Corp. l. 36, 721, 2010
1342010
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy: further thoughts and a reply to critics
LA Bebchuk, J Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998
1331998
Rationalizing criminal forfeiture
DJ Fried
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 79, 328, 1988
1271988
Open market repurchases: signaling or managerial opportunism?
JM Fried
Theoretical inquiries in Law 2 (2), 2001
1222001
Executive compensation at Fannie Mae: A case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
J. Corp. L. 30, 807, 2004
1202004
A rendszer jelenleg nem tudja elvégezni a műveletet. Próbálkozzon újra később.
Cikkek 1–20