The cognitive structure of scientific revolutions H Andersen, P Barker, X Chen, RD Tweney Aestimatio: Sources and Studies in the History of Science 3, 153-162, 2006 | 332 | 2006 |
Thomas Kuhn‘s latest notion of incommensurability X Chen Journal for general philosophy of science 28 (2), 257-273, 1997 | 120 | 1997 |
Why do people misunderstand climate change? Heuristics, mental models and ontological assumptions X Chen Climatic Change 108 (1), 31-46, 2011 | 90 | 2011 |
Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychology H Andersen, P Barker, X Chen Philosophical Psychology 9 (3), 347-363, 1996 | 90 | 1996 |
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology X Chen, H Andersen, P Barker Philosophical psychology 11 (1), 5-28, 1998 | 88 | 1998 |
Kuhn on concepts and categorization P Barker, X Chen, H Andersen Thomas Kuhn, 212-245, 2003 | 74 | 2003 |
Continuity through revolutions: A frame-based account of conceptual change during scientific revolutions X Chen, P Barker Philosophy of Science 67 (S3), S208-S223, 2000 | 53 | 2000 |
Object and event concepts: A cognitive mechanism of incommensurability X Chen Philosophy of science 70 (5), 962-974, 2003 | 41 | 2003 |
Why did John Herschel fail to understand polarization? The differences between object and event concepts X Chen Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (3), 491-513, 2003 | 28 | 2003 |
Instrumental traditions and theories of light: The uses of instruments in the optical revolution X Chen Springer Science & Business Media, 2013 | 23 | 2013 |
Taxonomic changes and the particle-wave debate in early nineteenth-century Britain X Chen Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2), 251-271, 1995 | 20 | 1995 |
Local Incommensurability and Communicablity X Chen PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science …, 1990 | 19 | 1990 |
The object bias and the study of scientific revolutions: Lessons from developmental psychology X Chen Philosophical Psychology 20 (4), 479-503, 2007 | 18 | 2007 |
Transforming temporal knowledge: Conceptual change between event concepts X Chen Perspectives on Science 13 (1), 49-73, 2005 | 15 | 2005 |
Scripts and conceptual change X Chen In Science, Cognitive, and Consciousness, Nanchang, 96-117, 2004 | 14 | 2004 |
A different kind of revolutionary change: transformation from object to process concepts X Chen Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2), 182-191, 2010 | 12 | 2010 |
The rule of reproducibility and its applications in experiment appraisal X Chen Synthese, 87-109, 1994 | 12 | 1994 |
Visual photometry in the early 19th century: a “good” science with “wrong” measurements X Chen Wrong for the right reasons, 161-183, 2005 | 11 | 2005 |
Cognitive appraisal and power: David Brewster, Henry Brougham, and the tactics of the emission—Undulatory controversy during the early 1850s X Chen, P Barker Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1), 75-101, 1992 | 11 | 1992 |
The greenhouse metaphor and the greenhouse effect: A case study of a flawed analogous model X Chen Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Western & Eastern Studies, 105-114, 2012 | 10 | 2012 |