Follow
Esa Diaz-Leon
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
What is social construction?
E Diaz‐Leon
European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4), 1137-1152, 2015
1422015
Woman as a politically significant term: A solution to the puzzle
E Diaz‐Leon
Hypatia 31 (2), 245-258, 2016
1152016
Feminist philosophy of language
J Saul, E Diaz-Leon, S Hesni
1152004
Can phenomenal concepts explain the epistemic gap?
E Diaz-Leon
Mind 119 (476), 933-951, 2010
382010
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment
E Diaz-Leon
Philosophical Studies 155, 99-116, 2011
322011
Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?
E Diaz‐Leon
Ratio 27 (1), 1-16, 2014
302014
Defending the phenomenal concept strategy
E Diaz-Leon
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4), 597-610, 2008
292008
In defence of historical constructivism about races
E Diaz-Leon
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2, 2015
222015
Sexual Orientations
E Díaz-León
Feminist Philosophy of Mind, 294, 2022
182022
Sexual orientation as interpretation? Sexual desires, concepts, and choice
E Díaz-León
Journal of Social Ontology 3 (2), 231-248, 2017
182017
Epistemic Contextualism and conceptual ethics
E Díaz-León
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 71-80, 2017
152017
On Haslanger’s meta-metaphysics: Social structures and metaphysical deflationism
E Díaz-León
132018
Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque
E Diaz-Leon
Philosophical Psychology 29 (8), 1186-1199, 2016
122016
Social kinds, conceptual analysis, and the operative concept: a reply to Haslanger
E Diaz-Leon
Humana. Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (22), 57-74, 2012
122012
Pejorative terms and the semantic strategy
E Diaz-Leon
Acta Analytica 35, 23-34, 2020
112020
The meaning of ‘Woman’and the political turn in philosophy of language
E Diaz-Leon
The political turn in analytic philosophy: reflections on social injustice …, 2022
62022
Kinds of social construction
E Diaz-Leon
Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, 103-122, 2018
62018
Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language
E Díaz-León
Philosophy: Feminism, Farmington Hills, Mich, 251-271, 2017
62017
Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap?
E Diaz-Leon
Mind 119 (476), 933-51, 2010
62010
Substantive metaphysical debates about gender and race: Verbal disputes and metaphysical deflationism.
E Díaz‐León
Journal of social Philosophy 53 (4), 2022
52022
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20